Purpose

This paper aims to propose a two-period model in which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) decides the remanufacturability level of products in product design and unit patent licensing fee at the first period, and a third-party remanufacturer (3PR) that has been licensed by the OEM enters the remanufacturing market to compete with the OEM at the second period.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper analyzes the OEM's optimal decisions of remanufacturability level in the product design and unit patent licensing fee at the first period, as well as the OEM's and the 3PR's optimal decisions of selling prices at the second period, under two scenarios that the remanufacturing is constrained or unconstrained by the collected quantity available at the end of the first period, by making use of game theory.

Findings

The study finds that the OEM will choose high remanufacturability in product design only when the unit cost saving of remanufacturing or unit production cost of new products exceed certain thresholds.

Originality/value

The study is the first attempt to simultaneously integrate product design and patent licensing in remanufacturing. It provides useful insights for OEM managers who face competition from 3PRs and may use their product design strategies to deter 3PRs and may protect patent of products by levying patent licensing fees from 3PRs.

中文翻译：

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具有专利保护的闭环供应链中的产品设计和定价策略

目的

本文旨在提出一个两期模型，其中原始设备制造商 (OEM) 在第一期决定产品设计和单位专利许可费中产品的可再制造水平，而第三方再制造商 (3PR)获得OEM许可的企业在第二阶段进入再制造市场与OEM竞争。

设计/方法/方法

本文分析了第一期OEM在产品设计和单位专利许可费中的可再制造水平最优决策，以及第二期OEM和3PR在再制造受限的两种情况下的销售价格最优决策。或不受第一期末可用收集数量的限制，利用博弈论。

发现

研究发现，只有当再制造的单位成本节约或新产品的单位生产成本超过一定阈值时，OEM才会在产品设计中选择高再制造性。

原创性/价值

该研究是第一次尝试在再制造中同时整合产品设计和专利许可。它为面临 3PR 竞争的 OEM 经理提供了有用的见解，他们可能会使用他们的产品设计策略来威慑 3PR，并可以通过向 3PR 征收专利许可费来保护产品专利。