Humans default to functions and purposes when asked to explain the existence of mysterious phenomena. Our penchant for teleological reasoning is associated with good outcomes, such as finding meaning in misfortune, but also with bad outcomes, such as dangerous conspiracy theories and misunderstood scientific ideas, both of which pose important social and health problems. Psychological research into the teleological default has long alluded to Daniel Dennett’s intentional-systems theory but has not fully engaged with the three intellectual stances at its core (intentional, design, physical). This article distinguishes the intentional stance from the design stance, which untangles some of the present knots in theories of teleology, accounts for diverse forms of teleology, and enhances predictions of when teleological reasoning is more likely to occur. This article examines the evidence for a teleological default considering Dennett’s intentional-systems theory, proposes a process model, and clarifies current theoretical debates. It argues that people rationally and often thoughtfully use teleological reasoning in relation to both cognitive and social psychological factors. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.

当被要求解释神秘现象的存在时，人类默认了功能和目的。我们对目的论推理的偏好与好的结果相关，例如在不幸中寻找意义，但也与不好的结果相关，例如危险的阴谋论和被误解的科学思想，这两者都会造成重要的社会和健康问题。对目的论默认的心理学研究长期以来一直暗示丹尼尔·丹尼特的意向系统理论，但并未完全涉及其核心的三种智力立场（意向、设计、物理）。本文将有意立场与设计立场区分开来，它解开了目前目的论理论中的一些问题，解释了各种形式的目的论，并增强对何时更有可能发生目的论推理的预测。本文研究了考虑丹尼特的意向系统理论的目的论违约的证据，提出了一个过程模型，并澄清了当前的理论争论。它认为，人们理性且经常深思熟虑地使用与认知和社会心理因素相关的目的论推理。讨论了对理论和未来研究的影响。