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Insider lobbying and government contracts: The moderating role of firm size
European Management Review ( IF 3.000 ) Pub Date : 2021-09-14 , DOI: 10.1111/emre.12484
José M. Alonso 1, 2 , Rhys Andrews 2
Affiliation  

This study examines insider lobbying as a form of relational Corporate Political Activity (CPA) that can be used by firms to gain an advantage in the competition for government contracts, and how firm size moderates the effectiveness of different insider lobbying strategies. Drawing on a unique dataset that captures meetings between private companies and British government ministers, we find that both the breadth and depth of insider lobbying are positively related to the value of the contracts awarded by the UK Ministry of Defence. Further analysis reveals that the benefits from a strategy of lobbying depth are stronger for small firms, than those from a strategy of lobbying breadth. The findings suggest that the bridging and bonding social capital cultivated through meetings with politicians can be deployed in alternative ways by different-sized firms.

中文翻译:

内部游说和政府合同:公司规模的调节作用

本研究将内部游说作为一种相关的公司政治活动 (CPA) 形式进行检验,公司可以利用这种形式在政府合同竞争中获得优势,以及公司规模如何调节不同内部游说策略的有效性。借助捕获私营公司与英国政府部长之间会议的独特数据集,我们发现内部游说的广度和深度与英国国防部授予的合同价值呈正相关。进一步的分析表明,与游说广度策略相比,游说深度策略对小公司的好处更大。
更新日期:2021-09-14
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