Kant states in §76 of the third Critique that the divine intuitive intellect would not represent modal distinctions. Kohl (2015) and Stang (2016) claim that this statement entails that noumena lack modal properties, which, in turn, conflicts with Kant’s attribution of contingency to human noumenal wills. They both propose resolutions to this conflict based on conjectures regarding how God might non-modally represent what our discursive intellects represent as modally determined. I argue that (i) these proposals fail; (ii) the viable resolution consists in recognizing that we modalize human noumenal wills as a merely regulative-practical principle in our judgements of imputation.

康德在第三次批判的第 76 节中指出，神圣的直觉智力不会代表模态的区别。Kohl (2015) 和 Stang (2016) 声称，这一陈述意味着本体缺乏模态属性，这反过来又与康德将偶然性归因于人类本体意志相冲突。他们都基于关于上帝如何以非模态表示我们的话语智力所代表的模态决定的猜想提出了解决这一冲突的方案。我认为 (i) 这些提议失败了；(ii) 可行的解决方案在于承认我们将人类本体意志模态化为我们对归责的判断中的一个纯粹的调节-实践原则。