I defend the actualist higher-order thought theory against four objections. The first objection contends that the theory is circular. The second one contends that the theory is unable to account for the alleged epistemic position we are in with respect to our own conscious mental states. The third one contends that the theory is unable to account for the evidence we have for the proposition that all conscious mental states are represented. The fourth one contends that the theory does not accommodate the intimacy we have with our own conscious mental states. To some extent, my defense will be heterodox, in the sense that I will show that some objections are satisfactorily answerable even if we concede to the objectors a point that higher-order theorists do not seem to be willing to concede, that is, that the theory is the result of conceptual analysis.

我反对四个反对意见，捍卫现实主义的高阶思想理论。第一个反对意见认为该理论是循环的。第二个观点认为，该理论无法解释我们关于我们自己有意识的心理状态的所谓认知立场。第三个主张该理论无法解释我们所拥有的所有有意识的心理状态都被表示的命题的证据。第四种观点认为该理论不适应我们与自己有意识的心理状态的亲密关系。在某种程度上，我的辩护将是非正统的，从某种意义上说，即使我们向反对者承认高阶理论家似乎不愿意承认的一点，我也会证明一些反对意见是令人满意的，也就是说，