Decentralization policy forms part of a broader global ideology and effort of the international donor community in favor of subsidiarity and local participation, and represents a paradigm shift from top-down command-and-control systems. Since 2003, the formalization of property rights through titling became an integral component of decentralized land administration efforts in Ghana. The creation of new forms of local government structures and the related changes in the distribution of responsibilities between different levels of government have an impact on natural resource management, the allocation of rights, and the unequal distribution of powers. This paper aims to understand how decentralization reforms modify the balance of power between public administration, customary authorities, and resource end-users in Ghana. Decentralization’s impact is analyzed based on two case studies. Relying on purposive and snowball sampling techniques, and mixed methods, we conducted 8 key informant interviews with local government bureaucrats in land administration, 16 semi-structured interviews with allodial landholders, 20 biographic interviews and 8 focus group discussions with small-scale farmers. The interviews analyzed the institutions and the roles of actors in land administration. Our case studies show that decentralization has the tendency to increase local competition in land administration where there are no clear distribution of power and obligation to local actors. Local competition and elitism in land administration impact the ability of small-scale farmers to regularize or formalize land rights. Thus, the paper concludes that local competition and the elitism within the land administration domain in Ghana could be the main obstacles towards decentralization reforms.

中文翻译：

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权力下放的政治：加纳土地行政管理的竞争

权力下放政策构成了国际捐助界支持辅助性和地方参与的更广泛的全球意识形态和努力的一部分，代表了自上而下的指挥和控制系统的范式转变。自 2003 年以来，产权通过产权正式化成为加纳分散土地管理工作的一个组成部分。新形式的地方政府结构的产生以及各级政府之间职责分配的相关变化对自然资源管理、权利分配和权力分配不均产生影响。本文旨在了解权力下放改革如何改变加纳公共行政、习惯当局和资源最终用户之间的权力平衡。基于两个案例研究分析了权力下放的影响。依靠有目的的和滚雪球抽样技术以及混合方法，我们对当地政府土地管理官僚进行了 8 次关键知情人访谈，对自有土地所有者进行了 16 次半结构化访谈，对小农进行了 20 次传记访谈和 8 次焦点小组讨论。访谈分析了机构和行动者在土地管理中的作用。我们的案例研究表明，在地方行为者没有明确的权力和义务分配的情况下，权力下放有增加地方土地管理竞争的趋势。土地管理中的地方竞争和精英主义影响小农将土地权利正规化或正规化的能力。因此，