This paper quantifies the benefits of discretion in the enforcement of environmental regulations. We identify and estimate a structural model of regulator-discharger interactions, exploiting an increase in the enforcement stringency of water pollution regulations in California. Our estimates indicate that most of the heterogeneity in punishments for observably similar violations is due to heterogeneity in discharger compliance costs rather than heterogeneity in regulator preferences. We find that removing the discretion of regulators to tailor punishments to discharger attributes would raise enforcement costs and decrease compliance by dischargers with high social harms of violations.

中文翻译：

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理解惩罚的差异：监管者的偏好和专业知识

本文量化了在执行环境法规时自由裁量权的好处。我们利用加利福尼亚州水污染法规执法严格性的增加，确定并估计了监管者-排放者相互作用的结构模型。我们的估计表明，对明显相似的违规行为的惩罚的大部分异质性是由于排放者合规成本的异质性，而不是监管者偏好的异质性。我们发现，取消监管者根据排放者属性定制惩罚的自由裁量权会增加执法成本并降低具有高违规社会危害的排放者的合规性。