We study optimal provision of unemployment insurance in a model where agents privately observe arrival of job opportunities and government’s ability to commit is imperfect. Imperfect commitment implies that full information revelation is generally suboptimal. Social welfare is convex in the probability with which agents reveal their private information. In the optimum, each agent is provided with incentives to either fully reveal his private information or not reveal it at all. The optimal contract can be decentralized by a joint system of unemployment and disability benefits in a way that resembles how these systems are used in practice.

中文翻译：

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社会保险、信息披露和缺乏承诺

我们在一个模型中研究失业保险的最优提供，在这个模型中，代理人私下观察工作机会的到来，而政府的承诺能力是不完善的。不完美的承诺意味着完整的信息揭示通常是次优的。社会福利在代理人泄露其私人信息的概率上是凸的。在最佳情况下，每个代理都被提供了要么完全透露他的私人信息，要么根本不透露的激励。最佳合同可以通过失业和残疾福利的联合系统以类似于这些系统在实践中的使用方式来分散。