We examine the symbolic management of participative strategic decision making (“PSDM”) programs that purportedly use crowdsourcing technology to solicit strategic input below the executive suite, but are often decoupled from actual strategic decision making. Specifically, top management may decide on a strategic option before soliciting input under the program. The first portion of our theoretical framework explains why disclosure of a PSDM program in communicating with security analysts is associated with more positive analyst appraisals, despite decoupling, and why the benefits of disclosure are amplified to the extent that leaders highlight the use of crowdsourcing technology in the program. The second portion of our framework addresses the antecedents of symbolic adoption. We suggest that firms are more likely to adopt and decouple a program when the CEO has a personal friendship tie to the CEO of another firm that has adopted and decoupled, especially following relatively negative analyst appraisals. Analysis of a unique dataset that includes longitudinal survey data from executives supported our predictions.

我们研究了参与式战略决策 (“PSDM”) 计划的符号管理，这些计划据称使用众包技术来征求高管层下的战略投入，但往往与实际战略决策脱钩。具体而言，高层管理人员可能会在根据该计划征求意见之前决定一个战略选择。我们理论框架的第一部分解释了为什么在与证券分析师沟通时披露 PSDM 计划与更积极的分析师评估相关，尽管脱钩，以及为什么披露的好处被放大到领导者强调使用众包技术的程度该程序。我们框架的第二部分解决了象征性采用的前因。我们建议，当 CEO 与另一家已采用和脱钩的公司的 CEO 有私人友谊关系时，公司更有可能采用和脱钩计划，尤其是在分析师的评估相对负面之后。对包含高管纵向调查数据的独特数据集的分析支持了我们的预测。