We experimentally consider a dynamic multi-period Cournot duopoly with a simultaneous option to manage financial risk and a real option to delay supply. The first option allows players to manage risk before uncertainty is realized, while the second allows managing risk after realization. In our setting, firms face a strategic dilemma: They must weigh the advantages of dealing with risk exposure against the disadvantages of higher competition. In theory, firms make strategic use of the hedging component, enhancing competition. Our experimental results support this theory, suggesting that hedging increases competition and negates duopoly profits even in a simultaneous setting.

我们实验性地考虑了动态多期古诺双头垄断，同时具有管理金融风险的选项和延迟供应的实际选项。第一个选项允许参与者在实现不确定性之前管理风险，而第二个选项允许在实现之后管理风险。在我们的环境中，公司面临着战略困境：他们必须权衡处理风险敞口的优势与竞争激烈的劣势。从理论上讲，公司战略性地利用了对冲成分，从而增强了竞争。我们的实验结果支持这一理论，表明即使在同时发生的情况下，对冲也会增加竞争并抵消双寡头利润。