In this paper, we study fraud and price regulation in gasoline retailing: We model the incentives that retail stations have to dispense less gasoline than the amount that consumers pay for: both under fixed and flexible price regimes. The results of the model indicate that competition, cheating fines, and law enforcement efforts reduce incentives to cheat regardless of the price regime. Interestingly, price-cap regulation itself creates additional incentives to cheat and reduces welfare. Nevertheless, its effect on consumers’ surplus is ambiguous.

中文翻译：

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价格管制和欺诈——特别强调汽油零售

在本文中，我们研究了汽油零售中的欺诈和价格监管：我们模拟了零售站必须分配的汽油少于消费者支付的金额的激励措施：在固定和灵活的价格制度下。该模型的结果表明，无论价格制度如何，竞争、作弊罚款和执法努力都会减少作弊的动机。有趣的是，价格上限监管本身创造了额外的作弊动机并减少了福利。然而，它对消费者剩余的影响是不明确的。