ABSTRACT

Professional sport, like most human activities undertaken for pay, is subject to Article 23(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Equal Pay for Equal Work”). An athlete’s ’work’ can be variously construed, however, as entertainment/profit generation, athletic performance, or effort. Arguments in support of gender wage parity in professional sport that are based on the former two construals must rely on counterfactual assumptions, given that most audiences and performances of athletes identifying as female do not currently equal those of athletes identifying as male. But philosophical and/or scientific accounts of counterfactual conditionals of the form ’If conditions X obtained, then the entertainment value/performance of female athletes would equal that of male athletes’ remain uncertain. Thinking of athletic work as effort, on the other hand, ties remuneration to a quasi-unobservable quantity, with paradoxical outcomes if varying levels of athletic or social disadvantage are taken into account. Procedural justice considerations, finally, such as equal opportunity do not yield wage equality unless we make similar counterfactual assumptions, or postulate a right to equal remuneration that is based on independent appeals to substantive justice. On either of these approaches, the philosophical case for gender wage equality in professional sport requires strengthening.

摘要

与大多数有偿从事的人类活动一样，职业体育受《世界人权宣言》（“同工同酬”）第 23 条第 2 款的约束。然而，运动员的“工作”可以不同地解释为娱乐/利润的产生、运动表现或努力。基于前两种解释的支持职业运动中性别工资平等的论点必须依赖于反事实假设，因为目前大多数被认定为女性的运动员的观众和表现并不等于被认定为男性的运动员。但是，“如果条件 X 获得，那么女运动员的娱乐价值/表现将等于男运动员的娱乐价值/表现”形式的反事实条件的哲学和/或科学解释仍然不确定。将运动视为努力，另一方面，如果将不同程度的运动或社会劣势考虑在内，则将薪酬与一个准不可观察的数量联系起来，会产生自相矛盾的结果。最后，程序正义考虑，例如机会平等，不会产生工资平等，除非我们做出类似的反事实假设，或假设基于独立诉诸实体正义的同酬权利。对于这两种方法中的任何一种，都需要加强职业体育中性别工资平等的哲学论证。除非我们做出类似的反事实假设，或者假设基于独立诉诸实体正义的同酬权利，否则诸如机会均等不会产生工资平等。对于这两种方法中的任何一种，都需要加强职业体育中性别工资平等的哲学论证。除非我们做出类似的反事实假设，或者假设基于独立诉诸实体正义的同酬权利，否则诸如机会均等不会产生工资平等。对于这两种方法中的任何一种，都需要加强职业体育中性别工资平等的哲学论证。