Using the actual and budgeted expenditure data of 241 South Korean local governments from 2010 to 2015, we find that budget decreases in the case of underspending are larger than budget increases in the case of overspending, which is in contrast to the asymmetric budget ratcheting pattern documented in prior studies. More importantly, we find that budget increases in the case of overspending are stronger when government officials have greater bargaining power as proxied by local governments located in the metropolitan area, having greater fiscal independence, and being affiliated with the ruling party. In the case of underspending, budget decreases are larger for local governments in metropolitan areas but do not differ for levels of fiscal independence and the political affiliations of local government heads. Our findings imply that the patterns of budget ratcheting could be diverse based on how local government officials strategically respond to the dynamics between bargaining power and the pressure of justifying budgets. We suggest that “justifying budgets” could safeguard public resources from inefficient budgeting.

使用 241 个韩国地方政府 2010 年至 2015 年的实际和预算支出数据，我们发现在支出不足的情况下预算减少大于在超支情况下的预算增加，这与记录的不对称预算棘轮模式形成对比在之前的研究中。更重要的是，我们发现，当政府官员具有更大的议价能力（如位于都市区的地方政府所代表的那样）、财政独立性更强且隶属于执政党时，在超支的情况下预算增加的幅度更大。在支出不足的情况下，大都市区地方政府的预算减少幅度较大，但财政独立程度和地方政府首脑的政治派别没有差异。我们的研究结果表明，根据地方政府官员如何战略性地应对议价能力与证明预算合理的压力之间的动态变化，预算棘轮模式可能会有所不同。我们建议“合理预算”可以保护公共资源免受低效预算的影响。