International organizations face a trade-off between the need to replace poorly performing leaders and the imperative of preserving the loyalty of influential or pivotal member states. This performance-politics dilemma is particularly acute in UN peacekeeping. Leaders of peacekeeping operations are responsible for ensuring that peacekeepers implement mandates, maintain discipline, and stay safe. Yet, if leaders fail to do so, is the UN Secretariat able and willing to replace them? We investigate newly collected data on the tenure of 238 civilian and military leaders in thirty-eight peacekeeping operations, 1978 to 2017. We find that the tenures of civilian leaders are insensitive to performance, but that military leaders in poorly performing missions are more likely to be replaced. We also find evidence that political considerations complicate the UN’s efforts at accountability. Holding mission performance constant, military leaders from countries that are powerful or contribute large numbers of troops stay longer in post.

国际组织面临着更换表现不佳的领导人的需要与保持有影响力或关键成员国忠诚度的必要性之间的权衡。这种绩效政治困境在联合国维和行动中尤为突出。维和行动的领导人负责确保维和人员执行任务、保持纪律并保持安全。然而，如果领导人不这样做，联合国秘书处是否能够并愿意取代他们？我们调查了 1978 年至 2017 年 38 次维和行动中 238 名文职和军事领导人任期的新收集数据。我们发现文职领导人的任期对绩效不敏感，但执行不佳任务的军事领导人更有可能被替换。我们还发现有证据表明政治考虑使联合国的问责努力复杂化。保持任务绩效不变，来自强国或出兵较多的国家的军事领导人在岗位上停留的时间更长。