Predictive processing approaches to brain function are increasingly delivering promise for illuminating the computational underpinnings of a wide range of phenomenological states. It remains unclear, however, whether predictive processing is equipped to accommodate a theory of consciousness itself. Furthermore, objectors have argued that without specification of the core computational mechanisms of consciousness, predictive processing is unable to inform the attribution of consciousness to other non-human (biological and artificial) systems. In this paper, I argue that an account of consciousness in the predictive brain is within reach via recent accounts of phenomenal self-modelling in the active inference framework. The central claim here is that phenomenal consciousness is underpinned by ‘subjective valuation’—a deep inference about the precision or ‘predictability’ of the self-evidencing (‘fitness-promoting’) outcomes of action. Based on this account, I argue that this approach can critically inform the distribution of experience in other systems, paying particular attention to the complex sensory attenuation mechanisms associated with deep self-models. I then consider an objection to the account: several recent papers argue that theories of consciousness that invoke self-consciousness as constitutive or necessary for consciousness are undermined by states (or traits) of ‘selflessness’; in particular the ‘totally selfless’ states of ego-dissolution occasioned by psychedelic drugs. Drawing on existing work that accounts for psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution in the active inference framework, I argue that these states do not threaten to undermine an active inference theory of consciousness. Instead, these accounts corroborate the view that subjective valuation is the constitutive facet of experience, and they highlight the potential of psychedelic research to inform consciousness science, computational psychiatry and computational phenomenology.

中文翻译：

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主动推理中的意识：深层自我模型、其他思想以及迷幻引起的自我消解的挑战

大脑功能的预测处理方法越来越有希望阐明各种现象学状态的计算基础。然而，目前尚不清楚预测处理是否能够适应意识理论本身。此外，反对者认为，如果没有详细说明意识的核心计算机制，预测处理就无法将意识归因于其他非人类（生物和人工）系统。在本文中，我认为通过最近对主动推理框架中现象自我建模的描述，可以对预测大脑中的意识进行描述。这里的核心主张是，现象意识是以“主观评价”为基础的——对不言而喻的（“健身促进”）行动结果的精确性或“可预测性”的深刻推论。基于此，我认为这种方法可以批判性地告知其他系统中的经验分布，特别关注与深层自我模型相关的复杂感觉衰减机制。然后我考虑对这种说法的反对意见：最近的几篇论文认为，将自我意识视为意识的构成性或必要性的意识理论受到“无私”状态（或特征）的破坏；特别是迷幻药物引起的“完全无私”的自我消解状态。借鉴在主动推理框架中解释迷幻引起的自我消解的现有工作，我认为这些状态不会威胁破坏意识的主动推理理论。相反，这些叙述证实了主观评价是经验的构成方面的观点，并且它们强调了迷幻研究为意识科学、计算精神病学和计算现象学提供信息的潜力。