In recent times, land acquisitions in India for both public and private projects are facing stiff political resistance. Existing studies on land acquisition mostly focus on optimal compensation that would secure the consent of land owners. In this article, we argue that besides compensation, membership in different types of networks such as political parties and self-help groups might influence landowner consent. This could occur either because of pro-social concerns or access to better investment opportunities for the compensation amount. Using survey data from flood prone Indian Sundarbans, where the government sought to acquire land to construct embankments, we find evidence supportive of our hypothesis. The survey elicited reservation price response from land owners for a hypothetical land acquisition program. Our estimates show that land owners with self-help group members are more likely to have a higher ask price for agreeing to land sales. In contrast, controlling for length of party association, members of political networks are more likely to sell their land and have a lower reservation price than their non-political counterparts. Our results suggest that, rather than only increasing the compensation package, which is a stock of wealth, it is equally important to enhance the flow of income to ensure consensual land sales.

最近，印度公共和私人项目的土地收购都面临着强烈的政治阻力。现有关于征地的研究主要集中在获得土地所有者同意的最佳补偿上。在本文中，我们认为，除了补偿之外，加入不同类型的网络（如政党和自助团体）可能会影响土地所有者的同意。这可能是由于亲社会问题或获得更好的补偿金额投资机会而发生的。使用来自易受洪水侵袭的印度 Sundarbans 的调查数据，在那里政府寻求获得土地来建造堤防，我们找到了支持我们假设的证据。该调查引起了土地所有者对假设的土地征用计划的保留价格反应。我们的估计表明，拥有自助小组成员的土地所有者更有可能在同意出售土地时提出更高的要价。相比之下，控制政党结社的时间，政治网络成员比非政治网络成员更有可能出售他们的土地并且保留价格更低。我们的研究结果表明，与其仅仅增加作为财富存量的补偿方案，还应增加收入流动以确保双方同意出售土地。