Abstract

In this paper, I first seek a relatively plausible formulation of the safety principle. To this end, I refute a recent form of safety by Duncan Pritchard and then defend another weaker form of safety as a necessary condition for knowledge. Second, and more importantly, I point out that this weaker safety is still insufficient, in that it neglects one’s belief regarding nearby error-possibilities—a factor that is largely omitted in the literature but could determine whether or not one knows. I then develop a safety-based account of knowledge that incorporates this element of belief concerning nearby error-possibilities. It is argued that such an account addresses various problematic cases and delivers useful resources for accommodating the phenomenon of knowledge-defeat, while preserving the important anti-skeptical power behind a safety principle.

摘要

在本文中，我首先寻求一个相对合理的安全原则表述。为此，我驳斥了 Duncan Pritchard 最近提出的安全形式，然后为另一种较弱的安全形式辩护，认为它是知识的必要条件。其次，更重要的是，我指出这种较弱的安全性仍然不够，因为它忽略了人们对附近错误可能性的信念——这一因素在文献中很大程度上被忽略了，但可以决定人们是否知道。然后，我开发了一个基于安全性的知识描述，其中包含了这种关于附近错误可能性的信念元素。有人认为，这样的帐户解决了各种有问题的案例，并为适应知识失败现象提供了有用的资源，同时保留了安全原则背后的重要反怀疑力量。