Rebel organizations often benefit from the sale of primary commodities. However, producing these commodities may require labor from noncombatants. Rebels provide security and payment to civilian suppliers, but their ability to do so depends on consistent profits. How, then, do price shocks to labor-intensive primary commodities undermine rebel–supplier relationships? I hypothesize that negative commodity price shocks lead cash-strapped rebels to ensure suppliers’ loyalty by substituting coercion for positive incentives. Conversely, states seek to limit rapid increases in rebels’ profit while avoiding the reputational costs of civilian victimization. Thus, victimization of rebel suppliers from groups such as pro-government paramilitaries is hypothesized to increase after positive commodity price shocks. I test these hypotheses with a new dataset covering 1999–2007 that combines monthly US STRIDE (System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence) data on cocaine price with municipal-level data from the Colombian Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica about the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and paramilitary groups’ use of civilian victimization.

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反叛初级商品市场、价格冲击和供应商受害

反叛组织经常从初级商品的销售中受益。然而，生产这些商品可能需要非战斗人员的劳动力。叛军向平民供应商提供安全和付款，但他们这样做的能力取决于持续的利润。那么，对劳动密集型初级商品的价格冲击如何破坏反叛者与供应商的关系？我假设负面的商品价格冲击导致资金拮据的反叛者通过用强制代替积极的激励来确保供应商的忠诚度。相反，国家寻求限制叛军利润的快速增长，同时避免平民受害的声誉成本。因此，来自亲政府准军事组织等团体的反叛供应商的受害假设在商品价格出现正面冲击后会增加。