In this paper, we investigate the importance of empirical and normative expectations for cooperative behavior. We conduct two experimental studies ($n=243$) in which we separately elicit (i) behavior in a public goods game and (ii) normative and empirical expectations of cooperation. In a situation where others’ contributions are known, we find a strong norm of conditional cooperation whereby people find it socially appropriate to match others contribution and believe others to comply with such rule of behavior. In contrast, when there is strategic uncertainty regarding others’ behavior, empirical and normative expectations diverge substantially. While individuals believe that contributing fully to the public good is the most appropriate action, they expect others to contribute only half of their resources. This renders normative expectations unpredictive for average behavior and underlines the importance of a close alignment of empirical and normative expectations for the influence of social norms on behavior.

在本文中，我们研究了经验和规范期望对合作行为的重要性。我们进行了两项实验研究（$n=243$) 其中我们分别引出 (i) 公共物品游戏中的行为和 (ii) 合作的规范和经验期望。在其他人的贡献是已知的情况下，我们发现有条件合作的强规范，即人们发现匹配他人的贡献并相信他人遵守这种行为规则在社会上是合适的。相比之下，当其他人的行为存在战略不确定性时，经验和规范的期望就会大相径庭。虽然个人认为完全为公共利益做出贡献是最合适的行动，但他们希望其他人只贡献他们一半的资源。