Debunking arguments in ethics contend that our moral beliefs have dubious evolutionary, cultural, or psychological origins—hence concluding that we should doubt such beliefs. Debates about debunking are often couched in coarse-grained terms—about whether our moral beliefs are justified or not, for instance. In this paper, I propose a more detailed Bayesian analysis of debunking arguments, which proceeds in the fine-grained framework of rational confidence. Such analysis promises several payoffs: it highlights how debunking arguments don’t affect all agents, but rather only those agents who updated on their intuitions using a specific range of evidentiary weights; it underscores how the debunkers shouldn’t conclude that we should reduce confidence beyond some threshold, but rather only that we should reduce confidence by some amount; and it proposes a method of integrating different kinds of evidence—about the kinds of epistemic flaws at play, about the different possible origins of our moral beliefs, about the background normative assumptions we’re entitled to make—in order to arrive at a rational moral credence in light of debunking.

伦理学中的驳斥论点认为，我们的道德信仰具有可疑的进化、文化或心理起源——因此得出结论，我们应该怀疑这些信仰。关于揭穿的争论通常用粗略的术语表达——例如，关于我们的道德信念是否合理。在这篇论文中，我提出了对揭穿论点的更详细的贝叶斯分析，该分析在理性信心的细粒度框架中进行。这样的分析有望带来几个回报：它强调了揭穿论点不会影响所有代理人，而只会影响那些使用特定范围的证据权重来更新他们的直觉的代理人；它强调了揭穿者不应该得出结论，我们应该将信心降低到某个阈值以上，而只是我们应该降低一定程度的信心；