We consider a spatial bargaining model where players collectively choose a facility location on a two-dimensional rectilinear distance space through bargaining using the unanimity rule. We show that as players become infinitely patient, their stationary subgame perfect equilibrium utilities converge to the utilities that satisfy the lexicographic maximin utility criterion introduced by Sen (Collective choice and social welfare, 1970).

中文翻译：

---

直线设施选址问题中的空间讨价还价

我们考虑一种空间谈判模型，其中玩家通过使用一致规则进行谈判，在二维直线距离空间上集体选择设施位置。我们表明，随着玩家变得无限耐心，他们的平稳子博弈完美均衡效用会收敛到满足 Sen（集体选择和社会福利，1970）引入的字典序最大化效用标准的效用。