We use three complementary quasi-experimental approaches to study the causal effect of introducing a penalty-point system (PPS) in Spain in July 1 2006, on drivers' behavior. According to Regression-Discontinuity (RD) estimates, the PPS decreased the number of traffic offenders by 14%, and this deterrence effect was directly related to the severity of the penalty. Concerns that RD estimates may over- or under-state the longer-run effects of the policy change are addressed by presenting the Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimates, which reveal that the deterrence effect of this reform increased over time. Crucially, the reform also curbed accidents by 14%, injuries by 16%, and fatalities by 14%, and these effects persisted over time. Difference-in-RD estimates are consistent with the other two approaches. Altogether, the reform represented net benefits of over 946 million EUR per year (or 0.09% of the Spanish GDP) during the first three years after implementation.

我们使用三种互补的准实验方法来研究 2006 年 7 月 1 日在西班牙引入罚分系统 (PPS) 对驾驶员行为的因果影响。根据 Regression-Discontinuity (RD) 估计，PPS 将交通违法者的数量减少了 14%，这种威慑效果与处罚的严重程度直接相关。对 RD 估计可能高估或低估政策变化的长期影响的担忧通过提供差异中的差异 (DiD) 估计来解决，这表明这项改革的威慑效果随着时间的推移而增加。至关重要的是，改革还减少了 14% 的事故、16% 的伤害和 14% 的死亡，并且这些影响会随着时间的推移而持续存在。RD 估计值的差异与其他两种方法一致。总而言之，