If, as Hegel claims, all philosophy is idealism, then defining his philosophy in these terms makes his idealism a metaphilosophy. This most obvious fact about his definition is the most overlooked. It is the key to a definitive, comprehensive and clear-cut interpretation of Hegel’s idealism. If Hegel defines all philosophy as idealism and thus his own idealism as a metaphilosophy, then his own idealism must be both the same as the old philosophies in this respect and also different in the sense that it embodies self-conscious awareness. Hegel divides philosophy into pre-reflective, pre-speculative, unconscious idealism and his own reflective, speculative, thus self-conscious, absolute idealism. Missing this obvious fact is the Achilles’ heel of Stern’s non-mentalistic interpretation in the only other in-depth study of this topic, the object of this article’s critique. If Hegel’s idealism is a metaphilosophy, then it is a radical mentalistic ontology of mind and its thoughts.

中文翻译：

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黑格尔的唯心主义元哲学

如果正如黑格尔所说，所有哲学都是唯心主义，那么用这些术语定义他的哲学会使他的唯心主义成为一种元哲学。这个关于他的定义的最明显的事实是最容易被忽视的。它是对黑格尔唯心主义作出明确、全面和清晰解释的关键。如果黑格尔把一切哲学都定义为唯心主义，从而把他自己的唯心主义定义为一种元哲学，那么他自己的唯心主义既在这方面与旧哲学相同，又在体现自觉意识的意义上有所不同。黑格尔将哲学分为前反思的、前思辨的、无意识的唯心主义和他自己反思的、思辨的、因而是自觉的、绝对的唯心主义。缺少这个明显的事实是斯特恩在对该主题的唯一其他深入研究中非精神主义解释的致命弱点，这篇文章的批评对象。如果黑格尔的唯心主义是一种元哲学，那么它就是一种关于心灵及其思想的激进的唯心论本体论。