In this article I formulate a skeptical argument against the possibility of adhering to the divine will in a non-accidental way. In particular, my focus in the article is on a widely embraced modal condition of accidentality, according to which non-accidentality has to do with a person manifesting dispositions that result in a given outcome in a modally robust way. The skeptical argument arises from two observations: first, various authors in the epistemology of religion have argued that it is often not possible to reason reliably about religious matters, and second, non-accidentally adhering to a given norm is often associated with reasoning about the requirements of the norm in question in a reliable way. In addition to pointing out the existence of the argument, I outline strategies in which religious thinkers could reasonably challenge it by denying that reliable reasoning about the requirements of divine will is necessary for adhering to it in a non-accidental manner. Hence, I argue that the possibility of non-accidental adherence to the divine will does not depend solely on whether it is possible to reliably reason about what it requires one to do.

在这篇文章中，我提出了一个怀疑论点，反对以非偶然的方式遵守神圣意志的可能性。特别是，我在这篇文章中的重点是广泛接受的偶然性模态条件，根据该条件，非偶然性与一个人表现出的倾向有关，这些倾向以模态稳健的方式导致给定的结果。持怀疑态度的论点来自两个观察结果：首先，宗教认识论的不同作者认为，对宗教问题进行可靠的推理通常是不可能的，其次，非偶然地遵守给定的规范通常与对宗教问题的推理有关。以可靠的方式满足相关规范的要求。除了指出论证的存在，我概述了宗教思想家可以通过否认关于神圣意志要求的可靠推理对于以非偶然的方式遵守它的必要性来合理地挑战它的策略。因此，我认为非偶然地遵守神圣意志的可能性不仅仅取决于是否有可能可靠地推理出它需要一个人做什么。