We investigate the effect of overconfidence on a capital-constrained supply chain under platform finance (PF), in which the e-commerce retailer (e-tailer) sells products and pursues a financing strategy through a platform. The e-tailer’s overconfident behavior is gauged by a cognitive bias in the estimation of demand variance. We develop Stackelberg games under two PF schemes: fulfillment by platform (FBP) and by e-commerce retailer (FBR). We find that overconfidence influences participants’ decisions and performance. Slight overconfidence weakens the platform’s bargaining power since the e-tailer will make conservative order decision and the platform will cut the interest rate. Severe overconfidence may be exploited by the platform since the e-tailer performs insensitive to the interest rate. We find there exists a Pareto region that entices both parties to participate in FBP.

我们调查了过度自信对平台金融 (PF) 下资金受限供应链的影响，其中电子商务零售商（电子零售商）通过平台销售产品并寻求融资策略。电子零售商过度自信的行为是通过需求方差估计中的认知偏差来衡量的。我们在两种 PF 方案下开发 Stackelberg 游戏：平台履行 (FBP) 和电子商务零售商 (FBR)。我们发现过度自信会影响参与者的决策和表现。轻微的过度自信会削弱平台的议价能力，因为电子零售商会做出保守的订单决定，平台会降低利率。由于电子零售商对利率不敏感，因此平台可能会利用严重的过度自信。