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The economic theory of regulation and inequality
Public Choice ( IF 1.780 ) Pub Date : 2021-08-13 , DOI: 10.1007/s11127-021-00922-w
Dustin Chambers 1 , Colin O’Reilly 2
Affiliation  

Stigler (Bell J Econ Manag Sci 2:3–21, 1971) proposed that regulation benefits politically influential interest groups rather than advancing the public interest. The Stiglarian perspective predicts that regulation raises barriers to entry that limit competition and creates economic rents for incumbents. Apart from the direct economic harm of such policies, regulation generates additional consequences. One hypothesized consequence ushered by anticompetitive rules is the widening of income disparities. This article therefore surveys the growing empirical literature that studies whether regulation ultimately exacerbates income inequality. Beginning with the literature on entry and start-up regulation, we find that these rules, as predicted by Stigler, limit entry and dampen entrepreneurship. Moreover, recent studies also indicate that these regulations are associated with higher income inequality. We also review the literature on occupational licensure. Consistent with Stigler (Bell J Econ Manag Sci 2:3–21, 1971), the literature chronicles widespread use of barriers to entry in labor markets, which have documented regressive effects on the distribution of income. Finally, we review research on financial regulation, in which studies have shown that some financial regulations are associated with less entrepreneurship and higher income inequality. Taken together, the recent empirical literature buttresses and extends the implications in Stigler (Bell J Econ Manag Sci 2:3–21, 1971). Regulation tends to benefit incumbents by limiting entry of economic participants, be it firms or workers, and exacerbates income inequality.



中文翻译:

管制和不平等的经济理论

Stigler (Bell J Econ Manag Sci 2:3-21, 1971) 提出监管有利于具有政治影响力的利益集团,而不是促进公共利益。Stiglarian 的观点预测,监管会提高进入壁垒,从而限制竞争并为现有企业创造经济租金。除了此类政策的直接经济损害外,监管还会产生额外的后果。反竞争规则带来的一种假设后果是收入差距的扩大。因此,本文调查了越来越多的实证文献,这些文献研究监管是否最终会加剧收入不平等。从进入和启动监管的文献开始,我们发现这些规则,正如斯蒂格勒所预测的那样,限制了进入并抑制了创业。而且,最近的研究还表明,这些规定与更高的收入不平等有关。我们还回顾了有关职业许可的文献。与 Stigler (Bell J Econ Manag Sci 2:3–21, 1971) 一致,文献记载了劳动力市场进入壁垒的广泛使用,这些壁垒记录了对收入分配的回归影响。最后,我们回顾了金融监管的研究,其中研究表明,一些金融监管与较少的创业精神和较高的收入不平等有关。总之,最近的实证文献支持并扩展了 Stigler 的影响(Bell J Econ Manag Sci 2:3-21, 1971)。监管往往通过限制经济参与者(无论是公司还是工人)的进入来使现有企业受益,并加剧收入不平等。

更新日期:2021-08-19
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