Journal of Corporate Law Studies ( IF 1.093 ) Pub Date : 2021-08-17 , DOI: 10.1080/14735970.2021.1965338 Andrew Johnston 1 , Rachelle Belinga 2 , Blanche Segrestin 3
ABSTRACT
Institutional investor engagement with companies is a long-standing goal of policymakers. This article evaluates whether the UK's regulatory and soft law regime is likely to orient engagement towards its goal of long-termism and sustainability. After a historical overview, it notes that institutional investors have considerable discretion in whether and how they engage with companies. Three existing forms of engagement behaviour (termed agency, trusteeship and ownership) are identified, and the article examines whether the current regime promotes or discourages them. All three may degenerate into passivity, short-term share trading or ‘bad activism’ focused on short-term value maximisation, satisfying the actors in the investment chain but failing to steer companies towards long-termism and sustainability. The article concludes that the roles of shareholders and company management should be articulated more clearly in the stewardship regime, and puts forward a custodianship model of engagement that balances managerial autonomy and accountability.
中文翻译:
管理机构投资者参与:从激进主义到管理再到托管?
摘要
机构投资者与公司的接触是政策制定者的长期目标。本文评估了英国的监管和软法律制度是否有可能将参与导向其长期主义和可持续性目标。在回顾历史之后,它指出机构投资者在是否以及如何与公司合作方面拥有相当大的自由裁量权。确定了三种现有的参与行为形式(称为代理、托管和所有权),本文研究了当前制度是促进还是阻止它们。这三者都可能退化为被动、短期股票交易或专注于短期价值最大化的“不良激进主义”,满足投资链中的参与者,但未能引导公司走向长期主义和可持续性。