We study retail shareholder voting using a nearly comprehensive sample of U.S. ownership and voting records. Analyzing turnout within a rational-choice framework, we find participation increases with ownership and expected benefits from winning and decreases with higher costs of participation. Even shareholders with a negligible likelihood of affecting the outcome have non zero turnout, consistent with consumption benefits from voting. Conditional on participation, retail shareholders punish the management of poorly performing firms. Overall, our evidence provides support for the idea that retail shareholders utilize their voting power to monitor firms and communicate with incumbent boards and management.

我们使用近乎全面的美国所有权和投票记录样本来研究零售股东投票。在理性选择框架内分析投票率，我们发现参与度随着所有权和获胜的预期收益而增加，随着参与成本的提高而降低。即使是影响结果的可能性微乎其微的股东也有非零投票率，这与投票带来的消费收益一致。以参与为条件，散户股东惩罚业绩不佳的公司的管理层。总体而言，我们的证据支持零售股东利用其投票权来监督公司并与现任董事会和管理层沟通的观点。