The article asks the following question: Why do policymakers choose one (or more) agent(s) to perform new delegated policy functions? In order to shed light on the factors that drive policymakers' choice of a single or a multiple agencies delegation framework, the article investigates policymakers' choice to delegate macroprudential regulatory responsibility to either the central bank or to a committee made up of more than one financial regulator. Based on the analysis of an original dataset in 53 countries, we show that the choice among alternative delegation frameworks is driven by the logic of “policy control”: policymakers, who want to control policies with distributive consequences, choose the single agency model under conditions of political uncertainty and low agency independence.

中文翻译：

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授权的多机构困境：决策者为何选择一个或多个机构进行金融监管？

文章提出了以下问题：为什么政策制定者会选择一个（或多个）代理人来执行新的委派政策职能？为了阐明推动决策者选择单一或多机构授权框架的因素，本文调查了决策者选择将宏观审慎监管责任委托给中央银行或由多个金融机构组成的委员会调节器。基于对 53 个国家的原始数据集的分析，我们表明替代授权框架的选择是由“政策控制”的逻辑驱动的：政策制定者想要控制具有分配后果的政策，在条件下选择单一代理模式政治不确定性和机构独立性低。