In this paper, we test whether dynastic leaders differ in their policymaking once in office. Based on a large sample of Italian dynastic mayors, we do not find differences in policymaking in terms of average revenue and expenditure. However, dynastic mayors increase spending and obtain higher transfers during the pre-electoral year. We suggest that they might behave more strategically both because they can (thanks to inherited political skills) and because of higher interest to stay in office (due to higher returns from politics).

中文翻译：

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朝代与政策制定

在本文中，我们测试了王朝领导人上任后的政策制定是否有所不同。基于大量意大利王朝市长的样本，我们没有发现在平均收入和支出方面的政策制定存在差异。然而，王朝市长在选举前一年增加支出并获得更高的转移支付。我们建议他们的行为可能更具战略性，因为他们可以（由于继承的政治技能）和因为更有兴趣留任（由于政治回报更高）。