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Patrons and Personnel: The Foreign Determinants of Military Recruitment Policies
Security Studies ( IF 3.032 ) Pub Date : 2021-08-12 , DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2021.1951832
Max Z. Margulies

Why do some states develop conscript armies, whereas others rely on volunteers? Most theories of military design describe domestic elites as making decisions based on rational security demands or cultural understandings of what a military should look like. Contrary to these explanations, many states faced with the challenge of building a military are dependent on powerful military patrons with strong beliefs about how to design their clients’ militaries. When states that are building new militaries have foreign military patrons, they are likely to emulate their patron’s recruitment practices. Patrons with sufficient interest and will to engage in security force assistance use their influence to shape recruitment practices in new or postconflict states. This article describes the dynamics of military patronage as they relate to recruitment decisions and finds support for the argument using both original quantitative data and a brief case comparison.



中文翻译:

赞助人和人员:军事招募政策的外国决定因素

为什么有些州发展征兵制,而另一些州则依靠志愿者?大多数军事设计理论将国内精英描述为基于理性的安全需求或对军队应该是什么样子的文化理解做出决策。与这些解释相反,许多面临建设军队挑战的国家都依赖强大的军事赞助人,他们对如何设计客户的军队有着强烈的信念。当正在建设新军队的国家有外国军事赞助人时,他们很可能会效仿其赞助人的招募做法。有足够兴趣和意愿参与安全部队援助的赞助人利用他们的影响力来塑造新国家或冲突后国家的招募实践。

更新日期:2021-08-25
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