This paper explores a novel type of argument in legal theory—a psychological debunking argument—by the example of the justification of human rights and based on a psychological dual-process model of decision-making. Debunking arguments undermine confidence in a belief because of shortcomings of the empirical conditions under which it was formed. They thereby open a route from the descriptive to the evaluative, from Is to Ought, without illicitly crossing metaethical waters since they involve normative premises. As they are epistemic, they cannot replace substantive arguments on the merits. However, they may be useful when substantive arguments are stalled or the necessity to make a judgment precludes further discussions.The controversial justification of human rights is a good test case for debunking arguments. The challenge is to find features in the formation of beliefs about human rights that undermine their epistemic justification. Some psychologists claim that relevant beliefs arise from the rationalization of intuitions. This process is ill-suited to generate correct beliefs; so formed beliefs may be debunked. This also shows how legal reasoning might be improved.

中文翻译：

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权利作为合理化？对人权信念的心理揭穿

本文以人权正当化为例，基于决策的心理双过程模型，探讨了法律理论中的一种新型论证——心理揭穿论证。由于形成信念的经验条件存在缺陷，揭穿论点会破坏对信念的信心。因此，他们开辟了一条从描述性到评估性、从是到应该的路线，而不会非法跨越元伦理学水域，因为它们涉及规范性前提。由于它们是认识论的，它们不能代替关于案情的实质性论点。然而，当实质性争论停滞不前或有必要做出判断而无法进一步讨论时，它们可能会很有用。有争议的人权正当性是揭穿争论的一个很好的测试案例。挑战在于在人权信念的形成中找到破坏其认知正当性的特征。一些心理学家声称，相关信念源于直觉的合理化。这个过程不适合产生正确的信念；如此形成的信念可能会被揭穿。这也显示了如何改进法律推理。