The experiential self in interaction with an object is not, as Richard Rorty emphasizes, an inherent attribute that exists before real interactions, nor is it an entity with fixed characteristics. What Rorty constantly highlights is that the interaction in forming the self must achieve self-awareness as an entity impacted, acknowledged, and evaluated by others. This line of interpretation leads to two important concepts regarding the self’s formation that need to be clarified: First, when an individual expands his/her ability to manage space outside the reach of his/her physical person and visual perception, it is imperative that the individual is aware that he/she is controlling his/her own body. Second, the reciprocal effect from others cannot make the individual self-aware of his/her own existence as an independent entity if there is a lack of the other’s skepticism and questioning of the subject himself/herself. In this step of the self-experience process, the self’s attributes and its existence in relation to its surroundings are questioned. This article will focus on the explanation of the feasibility of perceiving the self as a form made up of biological premises and the awareness of the self as a living entity with contingent and flexible characteristics.

与客体交互的体验自我，不是像理查德·罗蒂所强调的那样，在真实交互之前就存在的固有属性，也不是具有固定特征的实体。罗蒂不断强调的是，形成自我的互动必须实现自我意识，作为一个受他人影响、认可和评价的实体。这种解释引出了关于自我形成的两个重要概念，需要澄清：第一，当一个人扩展他/她的能力来管理他/她的身体和视觉感知范围之外的空间时，当务之急是个人意识到他/她在控制自己的身体。第二，如果缺乏他人的怀疑和对主体自身的质疑，来自他人的互惠效应无法使个体自我意识到自己作为独立实体的存在。在自我体验过程的这一步中，自我的属性及其相对于周围环境的存在受到质疑。本文将重点解释将自我感知为由生物前提组成的形式的可行性，以及将自我感知为具有偶然性和灵活性特征的生物体的意识。