We consider the problem of constructing leakage-resilient circuit compilers that are secure against global leakage functions with bounded output length. By global, we mean that the leakage can depend on all circuit wires and output a low-complexity function (represented as a multi-output Boolean circuit) applied on these wires. In this work, we design compilers both in the stateless (a.k.a. single-shot leakage) setting and the stateful (a.k.a. continuous leakage) setting that are unconditionally secure against \(\mathsf {AC}^0\) leakage and similar low-complexity classes. In the stateless case, we show that the original private circuits construction of Ishai, Sahai, and Wagner (Crypto 2003) is actually secure against \(\mathsf {AC}^0\) leakage. In the stateful case, we modify the construction of Rothblum (Crypto 2012), obtaining a simple construction with unconditional security. Prior works that designed leakage-resilient circuit compilers against \(\mathsf {AC}^0\) leakage had to rely either on secure hardware components (Faust et al., Eurocrypt 2010, Miles-Viola, STOC 2013) or on (unproven) complexity-theoretic assumptions (Rothblum, Crypto 2012).

我们考虑构建防漏电电路编译器的问题，该编译器对具有有界输出长度的全局泄漏函数是安全的。通过全局，我们的意思是泄漏可以取决于所有电路线并输出应用在这些线上的低复杂度函数（表示为多输出布尔电路）。在这项工作中，我们在无状态（又名单次泄漏）设置和有状态（又名连续泄漏）设置中设计编译器，它们无条件地防止\(\mathsf {AC}^0\)泄漏和类似的低复杂性类。在无状态情况下，我们证明 Ishai、Sahai 和 Wagner（Crypto 2003）的原始私有电路构造实际上是安全的，可以抵御\(\mathsf {AC}^0\)泄漏。在有状态的情况下，我们修改 Rothblum (Crypto 2012) 的构造，获得具有无条件安全性的简单构造。之前针对\(\mathsf {AC}^0\)泄漏设计防泄漏电路编译器的工作必须依赖于安全硬件组件（Faust 等人，Eurocrypt 2010，Miles-Viola，STOC 2013）或（未经证实的） ) 复杂性理论假设 (Rothblum, Crypto 2012)。