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Inventory Games with Quantity Discount
Journal of Systems Science and Complexity ( IF 2.1 ) Pub Date : 2021-08-10 , DOI: 10.1007/s11424-021-9235-z
Wenzhong Li 1 , Genjiu Xu 1 , Jun Su 2
Affiliation  

Meca, et al. (2004) studied a class of inventory games which arise when a group of retailers who observe demand for a common good decide to cooperate and make joint orders. In this paper, the authors extend their model to the situation where the manufacturer provides the retailers with a price discount on purchases in excess of a certain order quantity. The authors define the corresponding inventory game with quantity discount, and show that the inventory game has a nonempty core. Then, the authors propose a core allocation rule, the demand-proportionality rule, and characterize it by introducing efficiency, the retailer splitting property and continuity.



中文翻译:

数量折扣的库存游戏

梅卡等人。(2004) 研究了一类库存博弈,当一组观察到共同商品需求的零售商决定合作并联合订购时,就会出现这种博弈。在本文中,作者将他们的模型扩展到制造商向零售商提供超过特定订单数量的购买价格折扣的情况。作者用数量折扣定义了相应的库存博弈,并表明库存博弈具有非空核。然后,作者提出了一个核心分配规则,即需求比例规则,并通过引入效率、零售商拆分属性和连续性对其进行表征。

更新日期:2021-08-10
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