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An epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Pub Date : 2021-08-06 , DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09805-y
Joshua Matthan Brown 1
Affiliation  

It is often assumed that the first stage of many classical arguments for theism depends upon some version of the Principal of Sufficient Reason (PSR) being true. Unfortunately for classical theists, PSR is a controversial thesis that has come under rather severe criticism in the contemporary literature. In this article, I grant for the sake of argument that every version of PSR is false. Thus, I concede with the critics of PSR, that it is possible that there is, at least, one fact that is ontologically brute. I then proffer an epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness. Specifically, I argue that whenever a knowledge seeker, S, perceives some unexplained fact, F, it is never reasonable for S to believe F is ontologically brute. I conclude that, even if PSR is false, it is more reasonable to believe that the key premise in the first stage of classical arguments for theism is true.



中文翻译:

对本体论暴力的认识论挑战

人们通常认为,有神论的许多经典论证的第一阶段取决于充足理由原则 (PSR) 的某个版本是否为真。不幸的是,对于古典有神论者来说,PSR 是一个有争议的论文,在当代文学中受到了相当严厉的批评。在本文中,为了论证,我承认每个版本的 PSR 都是错误的。因此,我承认 PSR 的批评者,至少有一个事实在本体论上是残酷的。然后,我对本体论的野蛮性提出了认识论挑战。具体来说,我认为,每当知识寻求者 S 感知到一些无法解释的事实 F 时,S 相信 F 在本体论上是野蛮的永远是不合理的。我的结论是,即使 PSR 是假的,

更新日期:2021-08-09
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