In the face of rapidly accelerating ecological devastations, it is obvious that we have to expand the scope of ethical and political responsibility beyond anthropocentric interests. This insight, however, should not lead us to give up human rights as a distinct normative status position. Even critics of anthropocentric rights (e.g. Peter Singer, Sue Donaldson, or David Boyd) usually assume some sort of anthropocentrism by directing their normative appeals to human beings. This implicit anthropocentrism of responsibility provides the entry point for justifying a distinct category of human rights based on respect for the inalienable dignity of all human beings. The bonds of solidarity facilitated by human rights fully include people living in particularly vulnerable situations, e.g. in an advanced stadium of dementia.

面对迅速加速的生态破坏，很明显我们必须将伦理和政治责任的范围扩大到以人类为中心的利益之外。然而，这种见解不应导致我们放弃人权作为一种独特的规范地位立场。即使是人类中心主义权利的批评者（例如彼得·辛格、苏·唐纳森或大卫·博伊德）通常也会通过将他们的规范诉求指向人类来假设某种人类中心主义。这种隐含的以人类为中心的责任主义为基于尊重所有人不可剥夺的尊严的独特人权类别辩护提供了切入点。人权促进的团结纽带完全包括生活在特别脆弱环境中的人们，例如在老年痴呆症的高级体育场。