I study a college-admissions model with two need-blind colleges and heterogeneous students. In a game in which colleges can choose a financial aid policy and either binding, nonbinding, or no early admissions, a unique equilibrium outcome exists. In equilibrium, the more prestigious and wealthier college is more selective, has a more generous financial aid policy, and offers nonbinding early admissions, whereas the other college offers a binding program. Compared to the counterfactual in which only regular admissions are offered, early admissions make the more prestigious college worse off, the other college better off, and students, in the aggregate, better off.

我研究了一个大学招生模型，其中有两所需求盲目的大学和异类学生。在一个大学可以选择经济援助政策并且有约束力、无约束力或不提前录取的游戏中，存在独特的均衡结果。在均衡情况下，更有声望和更富裕的大学更有选择性，有更慷慨的财政援助政策，并提供不具有约束力的提前录取，而另一所大学则提供具有约束力的课程。与只提供常规录取的反事实相比，提前录取会让名牌大学的情况变得更糟，另一所大学的情况会更好，而学生的情况总体上会更好。