Brazil's current electricity market design heavily relies on auctions, long-term contracts, and central coordination mechanisms. Combining these instruments has proved to be effective in ensuring resource adequacy, a key policy objective. However, the implications of the dominance of the centrally coordinated auctions for long-term contracts are worth examining. This paper argues that the current market architecture may not represent the optimum long-term solution for a sustainable market as it ignores consumer preferences to drive investment decisions, transfers risks to consumers, has made the short-term market less relevant, and suffers from regulatory and design complexities.

巴西目前的电力市场设计严重依赖拍卖、长期合同和中央协调机制。事实证明，将这些工具结合起来可有效确保资源充足性，这是一项关键的政策目标。然而，中央协调拍卖的主导地位对长期合同的影响值得研究。本文认为，当前的市场架构可能并不代表可持续市场的最佳长期解决方案，因为它忽略了推动投资决策的消费者偏好，将风险转移给消费者，使短期市场的相关性降低，并受到监管的影响。和设计的复杂性。