Two alternative models of fire sales that yield the same aggregate predictions have different normative implications. If fire sales result from marginal misallocation, a pecuniary externality leads to ex-ante overinvestment. If they result from asymmetric information, the overinvestment result is reversed. However, there may be a tradeoff between present and future underinvestment. Ex-ante macroprudential policy may need to treat different types of investment differently, but ex-post intervention is useful in both cases.

中文翻译：

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甩卖模型中的投资外部性

两种产生相同总体预测的大甩卖的替代模型具有不同的规范含义。如果大甩卖是由边际分配不当造成的，金钱外部性会导致事前过度投资。如果它们是由信息不对称造成的，过度投资的结果就会逆转。然而，在目前和未来的投资不足之间可能存在权衡。事前宏观审慎政策可能需要区别对待不同类型的投资，但事后干预在这两种情况下都是有用的。