A negotiating team is a group of two or more agents who join together as a single negotiating party because they share a common goal related to the negotiation. Since a negotiating team is composed of several stakeholders, represented as a single negotiating party, there is need for a voting rule for the team to reach decisions. In this paper, we investigate the problem of strategic voting in the context of negotiating teams. Specifically, we present a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a manipulation for a single voter when using a positional scoring rule. We show that the problem is still tractable when there is a coalition of manipulators that uses a x-approval rule. The coalitional manipulation problem becomes computationally hard when using Borda, but we provide a polynomial-time algorithm with the following guarantee: given a manipulable instance with k manipulators, the algorithm finds a successful manipulation with at most one additional manipulator. Our results hold for both constructive and destructive manipulations.

中文翻译：

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谈判团队背景下的战略投票

谈判团队是由两个或更多代理人组成的团体，他们作为一个谈判方联合在一起，因为他们有一个与谈判相关的共同目标。由于谈判团队由多个利益相关者组成，代表一个谈判方，因此需要有一个投票规则来让团队达成决策。在本文中，我们研究了谈判团队背景下的战略投票问题。具体来说，我们提出了一个多项式时间算法，该算法在使用位置评分规则时为单个选民找到操作。我们表明，当存在使用 x 批准规则的操纵者联盟时，该问题仍然易于处理。使用 Borda 时，联合操作问题在计算上变得困难，但我们提供了具有以下保证的多项式时间算法：给定一个具有 k 个操纵器的可操纵实例，该算法找到最多一个附加操纵器的成功操纵。我们的结果适用于建设性和破坏性操作。