It is widely agreed that in countries without major constraints on administrative capacity, a value-added tax (VAT) should tax all goods and services at a uniform rate. In these countries, VAT’s C-efficiency, that is, actual revenue over potential revenue, should be one if compliance is perfect. Under this approach, VAT’s C-inefficiency—the aggregate of the policy gap (exemptions, reduced rates, thresholds) and the compliance gap (revenue shortfalls due to laps in compliance and implementation)—is treated as a residual. This contribution shows that calculating VAT’s C-inefficiency independently of its C-efficiency produces a more telling benchmark, particularly of the policy gap. This is illustrated by an analysis of the revenues of the Dutch VAT, which, given the common VAT directive, should be representative of the VATs in other European Union Member States. The large policy gap, hovering around 0.50, forms the background for exploring three options to improve VAT’s performance: reforming the common directive, ceding VAT design to Member States, and introducing a common modern VAT which can be piggybacked by Member States.

人们普遍认为，在对行政能力没有重大限制的国家，增值税 (VAT) 应按统一税率对所有商品和服务征税。在这些国家，增值税的 C 效率，即实际收入超过潜在收入，如果合规性完美，应该是其中之一。在这种方法下，增值税的 C 低效率——政策差距（豁免、降低税率、门槛）和合规差距（由于合规和实施的失误导致的收入短缺）的总和——被视为残差。这一贡献表明，独立于其 C 效率计算增值税的 C 效率会产生一个更有说服力的基准，尤其是政策差距。对荷兰增值税收入的分析说明了这一点，鉴于共同的增值税指令，应代表其他欧盟成员国的增值税。徘徊在 0.50 左右的巨大政策差距构成了探索提高增值税绩效的三种选择的背景：改革共同指令、将增值税设计让给成员国，以及引入可由成员国捎带的共同现代增值税。