Morally speaking, what should one do when one is morally uncertain? Call this the Moral Uncertainty Question. In this paper, I argue that a non-ideal moral theory provides the best answer to the Moral Uncertainty Question. I begin by arguing for a strong ought-implies-can principle—morally ought implies agentially can—and use that principle to clarify the structure of a compelling non-ideal moral theory. I then describe the ways in which one’s moral uncertainty affects one’s moral prescriptions: moral uncertainty constrains the set of moral prescriptions one is subject to, and at the same time generates new non-ideal moral reasons for action. I end by surveying the problems that plague alternative answers to the Moral Uncertainty Question, and show that my preferred answer avoids most of those problems.

从道德上讲，当一个人在道德上不确定时应该怎么做？将此称为道德不确定性问题。在本文中，我认为非理想的道德理论为道德不确定性问题提供了最佳答案。我首先论证了一个强有力的 ought-implies-can 原则——道德上应该暗示着行为上可以——并使用该原则来阐明一个令人信服的非理想道德理论的结构。然后我描述了一个人的道德不确定性影响一个人的道德处方的方式：道德不确定性限制了一个人所服从的一组道德规定，同时产生了行动的新的非理想的道德理由。最后，我调查了困扰道德不确定性问题的替代答案的问题，并表明我的首选答案避免了大多数这些问题。