Price-cap regulation is a form of performance-based ratemaking that offers electric distribution utilities a fundamental alternative to traditional rate-of-return regulation. Economic theory suggests that price caps, which set annual rate changes based on industry-wide productivity, should incentivize improved performance within the regulated utility. This analysis tests that theory by comparing rate outcomes among a control group of firms regulated under the traditional rate-of-return method against rate outcomes under price caps in Alberta and Ontario across time. The findings suggest a downward effect on the annual escalation of customer rates under price-cap regulation.

价格上限监管是一种基于绩效的费率制定形式，它为配电公司提供了传统回报率监管的基本替代方案。经济理论表明，根据整个行业的生产力设定年费率变化的价格上限应该激励受监管公用事业的绩效提高。该分析通过比较在传统回报率方法下受监管的一组公司的利率结果与阿尔伯塔省和安大略省不同时间的价格上限下的利率结果来检验该理论。调查结果表明，在价格上限监管下，客户费率的年度上升会产生下行影响。