This article examines the aftermath of the 1897 Riksbank Act in Swedish banking. The act placed banks with unlimited liability and those with limited liability on equal footing, removing the note-issuing privileges of the former. We consider whether changes in risk preferences occurred subsequent to the act, or whether extended liability was a sufficient deterrent. We conclude that when legal differences were removed, lower transaction costs for unlimited liability banks (ULBs) spurred aggressive competition, reflected in narrower interest spreads relative to limited liability banks (LLBs). ULBs also took on greater leverage and held less liquidity, which supports the Coasean interpretation that the shareholder liability regime mattered little. After 1897, ULB shareholders continued to receive higher dividends, enjoyed substantially superior returns on equity, and maintained an array of corporate governance controls to shield themselves against their additional risk.

本文考察了 1897 年瑞典银行法案对瑞典银行业的影响。该法案将无限责任银行和有限责任银行置于同等地位，取消了前者的发钞特权。我们考虑风险偏好的变化是否发生在该行为之后，或者扩展责任是否足以威慑。我们得出的结论是，当消除法律差异时，无限责任银行 (ULB) 较低的交易成本刺激了激烈的竞争，这体现在相对于有限责任银行 (LLB) 的利差更窄。ULB 还承担了更大的杠杆作用并持有更少的流动性，这支持 Coasean 的解释，即股东责任制度无关紧要。1897年后，ULB股东继续获得更高的股息，