ABSTRACT

In this paper, I make a case for the modularity of the motor system. I start where many do in discussions of modularity, by considering the extent to which the motor system is cognitively penetrable, i.e. the extent to which its processing and outputs are causally influenced, in a semantically coherent way, by states of central cognition. I present some empirical findings from a range of sensorimotor adaptation studies that strongly suggest that there are limits to such influence under certain conditions. These results cry out for an explanation. In the remainder of the paper, I provide one: The motor system is cognitively penetrable, but nonetheless modular along broadly Fodorian lines, insofar as it is informationally encapsulated. This means that its access is limited to its own proprietary database in computing its function from input to output, which does not include the information stored in central cognition. I then offer a model of action control, from distal intention to action outcomes, that further helps to illustrate this picture and can accommodate the target empirical findings.

摘要

在本文中，我为电机系统的模块化提供了一个案例。我从很多人在讨论模块化开始，通过考虑运动系统在认知上的可渗透程度，即它的处理和输出以语义连贯的方式受到中央认知状态的因果影响的程度。我提出了一系列感觉运动适应研究的一些经验发现，这些发现强烈表明在某些条件下这种影响是有限的。这些结果迫切需要一个解释。在论文的其余部分，我提供了一个：运动系统在认知上是可穿透的，但仍然按照广泛的 Fodorian 路线模块化，就其信息封装而言。这意味着在计算其从输入到输出的功能时，它的访问仅限于自己的专有数据库，其中不包括存储在中央认知中的信息。然后，我提供了一个行动控制模型，从远期意图到行动结果，这进一步有助于说明这幅图并可以适应目标实证结果。