The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between the Hegelian conception of recognition, which is championed by Axel Honneth and others, and the conception of second-personal authority put forward by Stephen Darwall. It is argued that despite appearances to the contrary, they are not to be as easily aligned as some might suspect or hope, and in particular that an individual can be granted recognition in an Hegelian sense, without being granted second-personal authority. This view is defended by appeal to key texts on Hegelian recognition from Hegel's Phenomenology of Sprit: the account of confession and forgiveness, and of the master/slave dialectic.

中文翻译：

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黑格尔的承认是第二人称的吗？黑格尔说“不”

本文的目的是考察阿克塞尔·霍内斯等人所倡导的黑格尔的承认概念与斯蒂芬·达沃尔提出的第二人称权威概念之间的关系。有人认为，尽管表面上看起来相反，但它们并不像某些人可能怀疑或希望的那样容易对齐，特别是可以授予黑格尔意义上的承认，而不授予第二人称权威。诉诸黑格尔的精神现象学中关于黑格尔承认的关键文本：忏悔和宽恕的叙述，以及主/奴辩证法，为这一观点辩护。