ABSTRACT

The study explores the borrowers’ credit risk factors, perception towards repayment interventions, and the problems of moral hazard affecting delinquency in uncollateralized loans issued by the Microfinance Institutions (MFI). It employs the partial least square structural equation modelling to develop a buyer-side perception-behavioural model for borrowers’ loan delinquency behaviour. The findings indicate that the borrowers’ perception towards MFI loan repayment interventions and group homogeneity significantly reduces the moral hazard problem leading to a lower delinquency rate. The household socio-economics characteristics also seem to have a significant association with the borrowers’ loan delinquency. Identification of borrowers’ credit risk factors and the interlinkage between borrower’s perception towards repayment interventions, group homogeneity, and moral hazard in loan delinquency can provide critical insights that MFIs can consider while disbursing uncollateralized loans to control the default risk.

摘要

该研究探讨了借款人的信用风险因素、对还款干预的看法，以及影响小额信贷机构 (MFI) 发放的无抵押贷款拖欠的道德风险问题。它采用偏最小二乘结构方程模型为借款人的贷款拖欠行为开发买方感知行为模型。研究结果表明，借款人对小额信贷机构贷款还款干预和群体同质性的看法显着减少了导致较低拖欠率的道德风险问题。家庭社会经济特征似乎也与借款人的贷款拖欠有显着关联。识别借款人的信用风险因素以及借款人对还款干预的看法之间的相互联系，