We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more complex behaviors than predicted by the welfare-optimal equilibrium, such as noncut-off behavior, lonely pioneers, and frequent switches of action.

中文翻译：

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实验室里的土匪

我们实验性地实现了一个动态公共物品问题，其中所讨论的公共物品是关于代理的共同世界状态的动态演变信息。由于战略考虑，受试者的行为与搭便车一致。我们还发现，受试者采用比福利最优均衡预测的更复杂的行为，例如非截止行为、孤独的开拓者和频繁的行动转换。