Abstract

How does centralisation affect public goods provision in Russian municipalities? Drawing on the evidence from 68 interviews with municipal elites in four Russian regions, we demonstrate that, first, centralisation through excessive regulation encourages the provision of a higher quantity of public goods but does not encourage their quality. Short time horizons and haste lower the quality of goods even further. Moreover, centralisation favours municipalities with higher state capacity. Finally, risk-averse behaviour by officials leads to a lower quality of public goods.

中文翻译：

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“没有时间追求质量”：俄罗斯地方治理机制

摘要

中央集权如何影响俄罗斯城市的公共产品供应？根据对俄罗斯四个地区市政精英的 68 次访谈的证据，我们证明，首先，通过过度监管进行的集权鼓励提供更多数量的公共产品，但不鼓励其质量。较短的时间范围和匆忙会进一步降低商品的质量。此外，中央集权有利于具有更高国家能力的城市。最后，官员的风险规避行为导致公共产品质量下降。